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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Aim of the paper Efficient Market Theory claims that prices contain all available information at a given instant of time (for more precise statements, see [1] ). The argument invoked to support this claim is arbitrage: if prices differed from their informationally efficient value, an arbitrageur possessing some information not reflected in the price would be able to make a profit, and doing so would bring the price closer to its true value. In this framework, price changes can only be triggered by some new, unpredictable piece of information. Therefore, as shown by Samuelson [2] , properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly, i.e. prices should follow a random walk. This theory relies on the assumption that all agents are rational and are all seeking to discover the 'true', fundamental value of a stock.
However, this assumption is extremely strong and has been criticized by many authors (see, e.g. [3, 4] ). It seems clear that many agents in fact do not behave like this. One reason is that the number of objective factors that can affect the value of a stock is very large, and that interpretation to be given to some 'information' is often totally ambiguous. Therefore, as emphasized by Keynes and more recently Orléan [5, 6] , market participants are more interested to guess the opinion of the market than to discover the fundamental value of the stock. As illustrated by Keynes' famous beauty contest [5] , the goal is to correctly anticipate what other participants do anticipate; this self-referential behaviour can lead to markets that differ strongly from the predictions of Efficient Market Theory. An interesting example is provided by a simple game that encapsulates the basic message of Keynes' beauty concept. In this game, participants must each choose a number between 0 and 100, and the winner(s) are those whose choice is closest to one-half of the average choice [7] . Of course, the fully rational choice is that all players choose 0. On the other hand, if agents are all totally irrational, the optimal choice is 25 = 50/2, but if a fraction f 1 follows this first level reasoning, the optimal choice becomes [25f 1 + 50(1 − f 1 )]/2, etc. Empirical studies show that the average is close to 25, and that 30% of the players predict a number close to 12.5. In the context of repeated games (such as financial markets), a natural strategy is to study empirically the statistical behaviour of the other agents and to play accordingly. (Agents doing this will be called 'strategic' in the following). A common temptation is to compare the present situation with similar situations from the past, and make the guess that what already happened is more likely to happen again. As Brian Arthur puts it: As the situation is replayed regularly, we look for patterns, and we use these to construct temporary expectational models or hypotheses to work with [8] . For example, price tend to decline before a war is declared, and to rise again once the war has actually started (as recent events again sadly confirm). Often, some plausible story is given to understand why such a pattern should exist. This convinces more participants that the effect is real and their resulting behaviour is such to reinforce (or even to create) the effect: this is a self-fulfilling prophecy. A large consensus among economic agents about the correlations between a piece of information and the market reaction can be enough to establish these correlations. Such a 'condensation' of opinions leads to what Keynes and Orléan called a The existence of trends and 'anti-trends' has been broadly documented in the economic literature (see e.g. [23, 4, 25] and refs. therein), where it is described as 'overreaction' and 'underreaction' to news. In the first case, the overreaction is later on compensated by a mean reversion, whereas underreaction corresponds to an anomalously slow adjustment of the price and the appearance of a trend. A well known study of de Bondt and Thaler [23] , that we will further discuss in the conclusion, shows that over-performing stocks tend to 'mean-revert' on the scale of 5 years, and vice-versa. Several 'behavioral' models have recently been proposed to understand these effects (see [4] , chapters 5 & 6, and [24, 25] ). We follow here the same goal of articulating a simple and generic model for these pricing anomalies. Although some ingredients are common to these models and ours, there are also major differences, both in the concepts and in their technical implementation. For example, in the 'investor sentiment' model of [24] , investors postulate the existence of alternating 'trending' and 'mean-reverting' phases that they try to identify from observation. In our framework, on the other hand, these phases dynamically appear as agents attempt to learn the statistics of price changes from past observations. This 'learning' aspect, much emphasized in [8, 26] is actually absent from the model presented in [24] . The model of Hong and Stein [25] postulates that some 'momentum traders' use (but only for a limited amount of time) the positive temporal correlations created by the slow diffusion of information among 'news-watchers'. The effect of these momentum traders is to reinforce the trend and to convert an initial 'underreaction' into 'overreaction'. In order to observe mean reversion effects, another category of 'contrarian' traders must be put by hand. In our model, on the other hand, 'trends' can appear without any fundamental news. In this respect, it is perhaps useful to mention the work on information cascades [27] , which, although very different in spirit, also describes a situation where a symmetry between two possible outcome can be broken by a small initial bias, amplified by a subsequent self-referential decision process. Finally, several families of models where trading strategies use the price past history have recently been investigated, for example in the schematic inductive rationality models (El Farol bar model [8] or Minority Games [26] ) or in agent based models where a fraction of agents base their trading decision on the recent behaviour of the price itself [28] [29] [30] 25, [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . The present model is interesting because the self-referential feedback is much simpler and its consequences can be analytically investigated in full details.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We describe and analyze the model in full generality in Section II, when agents try to use some correlations between the price and a certain information indicator, which can be exogenous or endogenous. We motivate our 'Langevin' description of the feedback dynamics and explain how non trivial 'equilibria' can appear when the self-referential tendency increases. We discuss the appearance of super-long time scales for regime switching (Section III). We then specialize to the particular case where traders use the past price changes as a source of information (Section IV), and where the above mentioned trend following or contrarian 'conventions' (or market sentiments) appear. In some parameter region, trends can be short in time but strong in intensity, which leads to large price jumps, or crashes. We then analyze some empirical data that support the predictions of the model (Section V). Finally, some extensions of the model are proposed, and our findings are contrasted with the predictions of Efficient Market Theory.
II. SET UP OF THE MODEL
We will call P t the (log-)price of a certain asset at time t, and δP t the return between t and t + 1. Here, ∆t = 1 is the elementary time step over which agents revise their strategies, which might be one day or one week, although in some case smaller time scales (like minutes) could also be usefully considered. We now argue that some agents base their strategy on the observation of the temporal change of a certain 'index' I t , which might be a financial index or an economic indicator (for example dividends, interest rates, inflation, confidence, unemployment, etc.), or even, as will be considered below, the price P t itself. We will denote as δI t the change of this indicator between t and t + 1. Note that δI t could in fact be a binary variable, representing a qualitative piece of information, and that the interval ∆t might not be uniform, and be the time interval between the arrival of news.
Suppose that there exists a causal correlation between the change of I t and that of P t , in the sense that the correlation between δI t and δP t+1 :
(We suppose for simplicity that all correlations for larger time lags are zero). It is then a well known result of linear filtering that the best estimate (in a quadratic sense) of δP t+1 knowing δI t is given by (see e.g. [16] , p. 132):
Now, we consider two types of agents, those who act randomly, or based on some information uncorrelated with I t , and those who try to take advantage of the possible correlations between δI t and δP t+1 . Since the 'fundamental' value of the correlation C is in fact not known, agents of the second type attempt to extract this value from past history, from which they try to learn the value of C. It is natural to assume that these agents give more weight to the recent past. A convenient framework is that of exponential moving averages, such that the estimated value of C at time t is given by:
where α sets the memory time T of the agents, as T = 1/| ln α|. Eq. (3) is equivalent to the following Markovian update of the estimated correlation:
We now suppose that the agents neglect the possible fluctuations of the volatility of I t and assume E δI 2 t is a constant (that we set in the following equal to unity, unless stated otherwise). Relaxing this hypothesis would lead to minor changes in the following. The expected return between t and t + 1 is therefore C t δI t ; it is natural to assume that one will buy (or sell) a quantity V t which is an odd function of this expected return:
In general one expects the demand function G to be linear for small arguments and to saturate for large arguments. In the context of an exponential utility function (called CARA in the literature), the quantity to be maximized is the expected return minus a certain coefficient times the variance of the return. In this case, the function G is found to be strictly linear. The saturation comes from both the limited resources of the agents and their limited ability to borrow and from an increased risk aversion for tail events [36] . Both effects tend to limit the invested quantity even if the signal is very strong. These strategic orders add to the non strategic ones and impact the price as:
where N is the number of 'strategic' agents that try exploit this correlation, and Ω t the total volume of 'non strategic' agents, which we assume to be a random variable of zero mean and variance σ 2 . (In fact, as we will discuss below, these non strategic agents could base their decision on other, uncorrelated information sources). The impact function F describes how a given order volume affects the price, and has been the subject of many recent empirical studies [37] [38] [39] [40] . Provided the elementary time step ∆t is large enough, this function is linear for small arguments and bends down for larger order imbalance. Here, we will neglect higher order contributions to F and simply posit, as in [41, 29, 30] :
where λ is a measure of the liquidity of the asset. Higher order corrections would only change some details of the following discussion. Since G is odd, its generic expansion for small arguments reads G(u) = au − bu 3 + ... with a, b > 0, with higher order terms that do not change the following qualitative conclusions. We finally obtain the central equation of the present study, valid in the small signal limit:
where C t is self-consistently expressed as (3), and g ≡ N a/λ, h ≡ N b/λ. These two equations basically describe the self fulfilling process that we study in details now. The parameter g will turn out to be crucial in the following; note that g increases with the number of strategic agents.
III. ANALYTIC RESULTS: SPONTANEOUS APPEARANCE OF CONVENTIONS A. A Langevin equation
In the absence of strategic agents (g = 0), there are no feedback effects, and the dynamics of the price is a simple random walk of volatility Σ 0 = σ/λ. The apparent correlation C t will describe any deviation from this trivial behaviour. Using Eqs. (3, 8) one finds:
where we have set 1 − α = ǫ, and ξ t ≡ δI t Ω t /λ is another white noise (because Ω t is supposed to be independent of δI t ), of zero mean and variance σ 2 /λ 2 . Now, we will write:
where η t and η ′ t are two correlated noises of zero mean, and κ the excess kurtosis of the index fluctuations. Therefore the evolution of C t contains a deterministic part and a random part. In the case ǫ ≪ 1 considered in this paper, where the memory time T ≈ 1/ǫ becomes much larger than the elementary time step, one can neglect, in a first approximation, the influence of η t and η ′ t (but see below). Taking the continuous time limit ǫ → 0, one can write a Langevin stochastic differential equation forĈ t = C t /Σ 0 in rescaled time ǫt =t:
where dξ is a Brownian noise of unit variance and the 'potential' V is given by: In the latter case, one observes two non trivial minima at ±C * and a 'potential barrier' ∆V separating them.
withĥ ≡ hΣ 2 0 . This is the so-called Landau potential that describes phase transitions [42] . For g < 1 this potential has an absolute minimum atĈ = 0, whereas for g > 1,Ĉ = 0 becomes a local maximum and two stable minima
Note that retaining more terms in the expansion of G would change the detailed shape of V (Ĉ), but not the above crucial qualitative feature. From now on, we will drop the hat onĈ.
B. The appearance of stable conventions
From the Langevin equation for C one deduces, using standard methods [43, 44] , the equilibrium distribution P (C) which is of the Boltzmann-Gibbs form:
where Z is a suitable normalization. Therefore, for g < 1 (weak feedback), P (C) is unimodal and has a maximum at C = 0, whereas for g > 1 (strong feedback), the most probable values for C are ±C * . This means that for strong feedback, a non zero correlation between the price and the indicator spontaneously appears. This correlation can be either positive or negative, corresponding to the two possible 'conventions'. However, on average, the correlation is still zero for g > 1, since C randomly flips between ±C * . In order to do so, a 'potential barrier' ∆V has to be crossed (see Fig. 1 ); the 'switching' time τ is well known to be given, for T ∆V ≫ 1, by the Arrhenius law [43, 44] :
with ∆V = (g − 1) 2 /4ĥ(3 + κ) and T = 1/ǫ. Because of the exponential term, this switching time can be much larger than the memory time T : one non trivial consequence of a phase transition is to generate time scales that are unrelated to the natural time scale of the problem. The convention can therefore persist for very long times. This is because the random event that would 'invert' the signal and nucleate a new convention occurs only exponentially rarely. Note however that the above formula is only correct when the noise ξ(t) is Gaussian; non Gaussian events do accelerate the crossing of the barrier [45] . We will see in empirical data that extreme events may indeed be a cause of abrupt convention changes.
When g < 1, the distribution of C is a distorted Gaussian around C = 0. Neglecting the non linear term leads to:
where we have assumed for simplicity C t=0 = 0. Hence the typical value of C is C ∼ ǫ/(1 − g) and typical time τ = T /(1 − g) for the variations of C, which diverges when g gets close to 1. The strategic agents thus amplify the excursions of C, but the most probable value of C is still zero. Strictly speaking, there is no stable point or convention in this case, although when g → 1 − the excursions are of larger amplitude and of longer duration, which corresponds to what can be coined a 'floating convention'.
1
It is interesting to give to the threshold value g = 1 a more intuitive interpretation. Recall that g = N a/λ, where N is the number of strategic agents and a the coefficient that relates the strength of the (apparent) signal to the investment volume. It is clear that the prediction of the future return must be compared to the volatility of the asset; therefore a ∼ v 0 /Σ 0 , where v 0 is the average volume of investment for an individual agent. On the other hand, if the number of non strategic agents is N 0 , one expects that the root mean square of Ω t should scale like √ N 0 . Therefore Σ 0 ∼ √ N 0 v 0 /λ (assuming that non strategic agents invest a similar volume v 0 ). Finally:
independently of both v 0 and λ. The conclusion is that the market enters the 'convention' phase as soon as N > √ N 0 . Hence 100 correlation-hunting traders are enough the change qualitatively a market of 10000 non strategic agents.
C. Overreaction to news
Suppose now that there indeed exists a small objective correlation between δP t+1 and δI t , justified by some real economic mechanism relating the two quantities. This means that the 'noise' Ω t+1 which governs the price dynamics in the absence of strategic traders and δI t have a non zero correlation coefficient:
where we conform to the common usage of calling this particular correlation coefficient the 'beta'. The effect of such a term is to add a linear contribution to the effective potential V (C) of the Langevin equation, which plays the rôle of a symmetry breaking field in the language of phase transitions [42] :
For g < 1 and β small, the most probable value of C is β/(1 − g) (= β for g = 0, as it should). Therefore, C is of the same order as its 'true' cause whenever g < 1. However, in the limit g → 1 − , the apparent correlation that arises becomes much larger than its true cause: the sensitivity of the market to external information is anomalously amplified. For g > 1, the term βC breaks the symmetry between the two conventions ±C * . In the limit ǫ → 0, the most probable value of C is given by +C * for β → 0 + and by −C * for β → 0 − (see Eq. 13). Therefore, in the convention phase, the amplitude of the apparent correlation is totally unrelated to that of the true correlations, although the sign of the correlation reflects the underlying economic reality. One observes here a typical example of overreaction to news leading to excess correlations that are well documented in the literature [23] . For example, the correlations between the stocks belonging to an index and the index itself are too strong to be explained by the intrinsic correlations between the stocks [3] . The present period (first quarter of 2003) is a good illustration of this effect: the cross correlations between U.S. stocks is at a historical high; due to the large uncertainty, traders' hunt for useful information is more acute, and the influence of the index on individual stocks is expected to be anomalously large. In our model, this corresponds to the case where the indicator I t is the stock index, a case detailed in section IV D. Another well known example is the excess correlation (in particular in crisis periods) between emerging country markets belonging to different geographic regions [22] . In order to understand the relation between these effects 1 We should add here a remark on the rôle of the multiplicative noise term gCtηt neglected in the above analysis. Since Ωt and ηt are uncorrelated, the Langevin noise has a variance now given by ǫ[1 + (2 + κ)g 2 C 2 ]. Going to the Fokker-Planck equation [43] , one can show that for small ǫ, the rôle of this extra term is to shift the value of the critical threshold to g = 1 + 2(2 + κ)ǫ. and the present model, we need to make the following remark: although C t is a correlation between unequal times, the equal time correlation between δP and δI measured on a coarser time scale will reflect the value of the lagged correlation C. In other words, causal correlations on a fine time scale do generate equal time correlations on a coarser time scale. More precisely, one has:
where the last equality holds if n∆t ≪ τ , i.e. when the coarse time increment n∆t is small compared to the convention shift time τ . Therefore, if strong causal correlations are established intra-day, as is the case between individual stocks and the index, an excess daily correlation between stocks will also appear, see section IV D.
D. Consequences for the price fluctuations: excess volatility
The feedback effect leads to an increase of the volatility of the price, since the instantaneous volatility is given by:
The non trivial dynamics of C therefore leads to a volatility increase, which can be substantial in the convention phase. This mechanism, interestingly, also leads to to volatility fluctuations (or 'heteroskedasticity'). These volatility fluctuations are characterized by the correlation time τ , which become large when g approaches or exceeds the threshold value g = 1 (see Eq. (14)).
The above mechanism can easily be extended to the case where agents scrutinize M different sources of information, say I k t , with k = 1, ...M . If the variation of these 'indices' are uncorrelated, it is easy to see that the simultaneous effect of all the different feedbacks leads to a volatility given by:
(with obvious notations). Therefore, the volatility can be substantially increased if a large number of information sources are overly interpreted. Within the context of efficient markets theory, all decisions are based on some 'real' information. This corresponds, in the above formula, to choosing Σ 0 = 0 (the price movements are all informationbased) and C 0 k,t = β k , where β k describes the 'true' causal relation between an economic indicator I k and P . What we have shown here is that because of the feedback loop, the empirical correlations (which are the only way to 'learn' the value of the β k 's in the absence of any firmly grounded theoretical model) are distorted and amplified, leading to a much larger apparent C k,t ≫ C 0 k,t , and therefore to a potentially considerable increase of the volatility as compared to its 'fundamental' value.
We believe that the above scenario for self-referential speculation is generic. When strategies are built using the outcome of past random events, a feedback loop can appear and destabilize the market from its putatively efficient behaviour. If the feedback is strong enough, a non trivial equilibrium can set in, where self-fulfilling prophecies can establish and survive. These conventions can have no rational basis whatsoever, or be the result of the amplification of a very small, but indeed objective, correlation.
IV. PRICE BASED STRATEGIES AND MARKET PHASES

A. Motivations
As recalled in the introduction, the basic tenet of the theory of efficient market is that prices instantaneously reflect all useful information. However, since all market participants face impact and slippage issues (due to the finite liquidity of any traded asset), those who believe that they have some useful information about future price changes must use it in such a way that their very action does not perturb too much the market. Otherwise, the potential gain associated to this information cannot be realized, or only on small volumes. Therefore, informed investors must, to some extent, 'dilute' their order in time. Doing so, they create positive temporal correlations -the slow incorporation of information into price is the 'underreaction' phenomenon described in [4, 25] . Other participants that see an increase of price can believe that it is due to some information not yet available to them, but that is reflected by the recent price change. These participants will be tempted to 'jump in the bandwagon' and act as trend followers: this is at the heart of the models developed in [4, 25] . Conversely, large orders in temporarily illiquid markets might affect the price too much ('overreaction'), and some restoring trades will later on move the price back to a more realistic values.
Hence, there might indeed be deep reasons for which it can be useful to watch past price changes and be influenced by them. That this is the case is practice is beyond any doubt, and is confirmed by casual observation of traders in market rooms and by several formal surveys ( [3] , p. 47). In fact, it seems that price itself is, for many traders, the most relevant source of information (if not the only one, in the case of some hedge funds using statistical methods). As in many previous models, we thus consider that the information used by some agents to predict future prices is the past price change itself. However, at variance with some of these models, the economic reality of the correlations is in fact not needed, since in the strong feedback phase these correlations may spontaneously appear.
B. Trend following and contrarian conventions
In this section we therefore study the model where δI t = δP t . In this case, the above correlation coefficient C t becomes the autocorrelation of successive price changes. The above analysis is almost unchanged, up to a renormalisation of the coefficient h that appears in the non linear term hC 3 t . This comes from the fact that the denominator in the linear filter, namely E[δP 2 t ], is now itself affected by the feedback effect. Hence, the phase transition found above for g = 1 is also present in this case. In the convention phase g > 1, the two states of the markets correspond to positive autocorrelations (C = +C * ), which can be called a trend follower phase where past price changes tend to be followed by a change of the same sign, or to negative autocorrelations (C = −C * ) in the contrarian phase, where past price changes tend to be followed by a change of opposite sign. Let us emphasize that a 'trend following' period is not necessarily a period where the price steadily increases (or decreases), but rather a period where successive price changes have a large probability to be of the same sign (see the central period in Fig. 2 , corresponding to C > 0).
We show in Fig. 3 the histogram of C t from the numerical simulation of Eq. (8) with Ω t a white Gaussian noise and for two values of g. Note that without a symmetry breaking term, the average autocorrelation is zero even for g > 1. We have here an interesting statistical process where the long time autocorrelation is zero, but where locally trends or anti-trends can appear and remain for quite long times. As mentioned in the introduction, this corresponds to the market folklore: practitioners often talk about market phases where trend following strategies are supposed to be profitable, and market phases where contrarian (mean reverting) strategies are supposed to work. Interestingly, any long term analysis of the average correlation coefficient would fail to reveal such phases. 
C. Consequence on the volatility
An important consequence of the existence of conventions is that the coarse-grained volatility can be different from the instantaneous one. As above, the instantaneous volatility is increased compared to its bare value Σ 0 and given by
On the other hand, the coarse-grained volatility Σ cg , defined on an intermediate time scale T * such that 1 ≪ T * ≪ τ (such that C t itself has not evolved significantly), is easily calculated to be:
This shows that the volatility is increased in the trend following convention and decreased in the contrarian convention. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 , where we show the result of a simulation corresponding to g = 1.2 and ǫ = 0.01, with a Gaussian noise term Ω t . Note that the true long time square volatility is equal to the time average of Σ cg,t , and is dominated by the trend following phases.
Eq. (22) shows that the volatility can have large fluctuations, and long term correlations; in particular, in the g > 1 phase, there are two time scales that govern the evolution of C t . One, relatively short one, governs the fluctuations of C t around the dominant convention ±C * ; the other, that can be much longer, is given by the flip time τ between the two conventions, Eq. (14) . It might be tempting to relate this to the well known fact that empirical volatility fluctuations reveal non exponential, multiscale relaxation in time [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 17] .
Suppose that one is in the trend following convention. The typical duration T of a trend can be obtained by comparing the value of the coarse grained volatility to the instantaneous one:
Hence, one can observe two types of dynamics when g > 1. If the change of convention is faster than the typical duration of a trend, i.e. if τ ≪ T , one obtains the dynamics shown in Figure 4 -b, where a period of low volatility is followed by a few sudden trends, which can be of any sign. Note that this can only occur if ǫ is large enough, which corresponds to a very short memory time, in other words that agents over-focus on very recent events. The phenomenology is in this case quite different from that shown in Fig. 2 , where the price displays many trends before changing conventions.
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed that the parameters g and ǫ were constant. This allowed us to extract the salient features of the model. In reality, however, these parameters should themselves be thought of as time dependent. Remember that g is larger when more traders (or larger volumes for the same number of traders) use past prices to decide on their action. It is clear that clear trending periods will increase the confidence in the trend following strategy and increase g. Although the full discussion of this extended model is beyond the scope of the present paper (see conclusion), we expect that reality might actually be a mixture of convention phases when g t > 1 and floating conventions or random phases when g t < 1. In this framework, crashes may be viewed as moments where both g t and ǫ become large: in panic situations, one expects the memory time to become shorter as agents think that immediate information becomes crucial. This can create a strong temporary trend following convention that leads to a crash: see Fig. 4 . As the convention accidentally flips over to the contrarian one, the volatility falls sharply and so does the perceived uncertainty. One can expect g t to become small again: the crash is over. For purposes of illustration and anecdotal evidence, we show in Fig. 4 a blow up of the 1987 crash period and the result of a simulation of our model.
D. A special case: regressing on the index
It is interesting to discuss the special case where the information I t is the stock index itself. It is clear that in practice, the evolution of stock prices on short time scales is strongly affected by the index, which is an immediately available piece of relevant information for all market participants. Let us call P
One the other hand, the feedback effect of the index on the stock price can be written as:
where Ω j t results from the trading not based on the index, C j,t is the empirical covariance between δP j t+1 and δI t , and Σ I is the index volatility. Using Eq. (24) one therefore finds, in the simple case where all g j are equal:
where C t = j C j,t /M is the covariance between δI t+1 and δI t . In the case of the index, it is reasonable to think that the feedback is a very high frequency one; therefore ∆t = 1 probably corresponds here to a few minutes. Summing (24) from t to t + n defines the return on a coarse-grained scale ∆I t . Assuming that n∆t ≪ τ , such that C t is approximately constant, leads to:
which is valid when n ≫ 1. In the above equation,Ω j is the aggregate of the noise Ω j over the time interval [t, t + n], 
If the Ω j t were uncorrelated from one stock to the next, and in the absence of feedback, the index volatility would be very small compared to that of stocks (of order 1/ √ M ). Empirically, though, the U.S. stock index volatility is found to be as high as a third of the individual stock volatility. Of course, one expects that the Ω j t are somewhat correlated, reflecting a common sensitivity to news. However, the correlation between stocks expected from fundamental analysis is insufficient to explain the observed correlation (and therefore the volatility of the index) [3] . The model presented here shows that a high frequency positive feedback leads to an increase of the index volatility by a factor 1/(1 − gĈ t ), which can be large. This increase is actually larger than the increase of the volatility of individual stocks induced by the above feedback (the factor is in that case 1 + g 2Ĉ2 t .
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The aim of this section is present some empirical data that support our contention that some anomalous correlations exist in financial markets, with persistence times which can be very long (ten years or so). We first present the case of the bond index vs. stock index correlation, which is interesting from the point of view of the present model because it might represent an empirical realization of the convention shift scenario predicted above. We then turn to the analysis of the (daily) lagged autocorrelations of the Dow Jones index during the 20th century, which are clearly found to be significant, and time dependent (positive -trend following, or negative -contrarian).
A. The bond/stock cross correlation A very interesting example of rapid convention change has taken place in the 90's, and concerns the correlation between stock markets and bond markets. The usual argument is that as long term rates fall, not only holding bonds becomes less profitable (bond prices rise) but also borrowing long term money becomes cheaper. Therefore stock markets become more attractive, and stock prices rise; this leads to a positive correlation between bond price changes and stock price changes. We compute the time dependent autocorrelation C t as an exponential moving average, as given in Eq. (3), where I t is the bond index and P t is the log price of the Dow-Jones. This correlation is indeed found to be positive, and very strong (≈ 0.5), in the beginning of the nineties (see Fig. 5 ). However, another story now seems to be dominant: a fall in stock markets signals an increased anxiety of the operators who sell their risky paper and buy non risky Government bonds. This has been called 'Flight to Quality'. The result is a negative correlation between stock prices and bond prices. Fig. 5 shows very clearly that a change of convention has taken place in late 1997; the negative correlation is even stronger now (early 2003). Quite interestingly, this convention shift has taken place very abruptly due to a series of extreme events both on the stock market and on the bond market (see the inset of Fig 5) , as would predict the model discussed in this paper. [Note that we consider here equal time correlations of daily returns; using the argument presented in section III C, we expect a high frequency causal correlation to manifest itself as an equal time correlation on a coarser time scale.]
B. The Dow Jones
We considered the detrended Dow-Jones index in the period 1900-2003, where the average return was subtracted. We have actually first fitted the log Dow-Jones as a second order polynomial in time, since the average return itself seems to have significantly increased between 1900 and 2000. 2 We again compute the time dependent autocorrelation C t as an exponential moving average, as given in Eq. (3), with now δI t = δP t , and where P t is the log price. Since the returns are non Gaussian, we compared all our results with a null hypothesis benchmark where all returns are multiplied by random independent signs, such as to keep the correct statistics of the amplitudes but remove all serial correlations. (Note however that in this procedure, the correlation in the volatility is preserved.)
We show in Fig. 6 the time evolution of C t computed for ǫ = 0.001 for the real time series. One clearly sees that (i) C t can be substantially larger than expected if no correlations were present and (ii) the time scale for the evolution of C t can be much larger than 1/ǫ ≈ 3 years. Plateaus that last several decades can be observed. The histogram of different values of C t is shown in Fig. 5 and is markedly different from the one corresponding 'scrambled' series, for which all correlations are killed. (The hypothesis that the two distributions are the same is strongly rejected by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The century was dominated by a positive correlation convention, especially between the 50's and the 80's. Nevertheless the negative correlation convention seems to appear after the 1929 during the Great Depression. There are also regimes where C t is close to zero. This suggests that in fact g has varied over the years, with periods where g < 1, with no clear trends nor anti-trends appearing, and periods where g > 1, during which the market is 'locked' in one convention or the other. In order to check whether the plateau values appearing in These curves show that conventions can persist up to 30 years. The change in convention can be rather smooth, like during the second part of the century. As we saw before, the value of the most probable value C * is related to g, i.e. to the number of agents using a self-referential strategy. Then these smooth changes can be explained by a continuous change in the number of these agents. A change of convention can also occur suddenly, triggered by an extreme event, like it did after 1929. It can be explained as suggested above: before the crash, g is smaller than unity and no clear convention exists. The crash induces an enormous uncertainty about the true value of stocks, and encourages agents to pay more attention to past price variations. This may have led to a substantial increase of g that favored the appearance of a contrarian convention.
From the data, it appears that there might be a systematic bias towards the trend following convention. One in fact expects that some symmetry breaking term, favoring C > 0, should exist in general: first, as mentioned in section IV A, there might be good reasons to think that positive correlations are indeed created by the time dilution of large orders, or other mechanisms. Also, for purely psychological reasons, trend following strategies are more likely to be adopted than contrarian strategies, because the pattern is much more obvious. This can be modeled by postulating that g depends on the sign of C t , with g + > g − . Therefore, nicely symmetric histograms such as those presented in Fig. 3 are unlikely to be observed in real markets.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we have defined and studied a generic, parsimonious model that describes the feedback effect of self-referential behaviour. If sufficiently strong, this feedback destabilizes the market and non trivial correlations can spontaneously appear, or be anomalously amplified. In this case the market enters a new equilibrium state where strong correlations between a priori uncorrelated quantities might self consistently establish. These anomalous correlations lead to both excess volatility (that may display long memory) and excess cross correlations. An interesting outcome of our model is (i) the existence of correlations with an amplitude unrelated with any 'rational' value, and (ii) the appearance of a very long switching time scale, unrelated with the natural time scales of the dynamics (i.e. the 'decision' time scale ∆t or the memory time T ). Therefore, our model displays regime switching over long times scales, which by the way justifies why agents should use a finite memory time in order to measure correlations in an ever changing environment. It is also worthwhile emphasizing that if the price itself is used as a source of information, some linear autocorrelations do appear on intermediate time scales, but average out on time scales larger than this switching time. In other words, the price process has zero average linear correlations, but non zero local autocorrelations (trending or mean reverting). We have presented convincing empirical evidence that such conventions exist in financial markets; one of the most compelling case concerns the correlation between stock markets and bond markets, where both market 'states' can be observed: the correlation appears to have rapidly shifted in the last decade from being strongly positive to being negative.
The model could be extended in several directions. First, one could consider serial correlations beyond the elementary time lag ∆t, say between increments lagged by n∆t. At the linear level, the stability criteria is easily shown to be g n < 1, where g n is the feedback strength corresponding to lag n∆t. However, interesting non linear effects can appear. For example, with two lags n = 1 and n = 2, one can observe a 'first order' phase transition where the most probable value of C discontinuously jumps from C = 0 to ±C * , with C * > 0 even close to the transition. This is distinct from the 'second order' scenario explored in the present paper, where C * ∼ √ g − 1. Second, one could consider the case where the different sources of informations δI k t are themselves asset prices is quite interesting since the feedback loop also affects the cross-correlation between the different assets. Non trivial coupled convention dynamics can set in, in particular when the number of assets is small.
An ingredient that should be implemented is the feedback between the values of the coupling parameter g and memory time 1/ǫ, and the past price dynamics itself. As we have seen above, the value of g is related to the number of agents (or more precisely the total volume of orders) that act in a self-referential way. It is clear that both in periods of large uncertainty (after a crash, for example) or within a speculative bubble where the trend following strategy appears to be successful, one expects the value of g t to grow. (A similar mechanism was recently considered within the 'Grand Canonical' version of the Minority Game, see [47, 48, 35 ]) It would be interesting to study a precise model where the dynamics of g t and that of the price and volatility are explicitly coupled, in the spirit of [29] . One can expect that such a model would be able to capture a lot of the financial markets phenomenology. Along similar lines, if there are several sources of information δI k t , one should expect that the feedback of successful strategies onto the value of the couplings g k,t will be unstable in the sense that one of the g k will grow at the expense of the others, because the coordination of strategies leads to stronger self-fulfilling prophecies and therefore larger potential profits. In other words, this feedback between the tendency to follow a pattern and its predictability leads to a condensation of the strategies in a few prominent conventions, with abrupt transitions between those.
Finally, we need to discuss the above model from the point of view of Efficient Markets, and show how it should be modified to describe the long term behaviour of market prices. If the information is systematically over-interpreted and the volatility much too large compared to that of the 'fundamental' value, the price should go on long time scales to completely unrealistic values. More precisely, the difference between the 'fair' price and the market price would typically grow as √ T . [In mathematical terms, the market price and the fundamental price would not 'cointegrate'.]. The answer to that paradox is that in fact nobody knows the fair price of a stock more accurately than within, say, a factor of two. This was actually proposed by Black [46] (somewhat humoristically) as the definition of an efficient market, and this view seems to us to be fundamentally correct. For example, the historical analysis presented in [3] , p. 8, shows that the price to earning ratio of U.S. stocks has indeed fluctuated, from 1900 to 2000, between 10 and 40. So it is reasonable to think that there is a wide band of prices across which arbitrage cannot take place, because of the lack of a reliable estimate of what the true price should be. As emphasized by Shleifer and others [4] , arbitrage only makes sense if one can compare the relative price of two assets, but becomes very dodgy if one speaks about absolute values. Therefore, one expects that as long as the price is within a factor two of the 'true' price, no mean reversion term, induced by the presence of arbitrageurs, needs to be added to our dynamical equation for the price, Eq. (8). Mathematically, this mean reversion effect is described by adding to the right hand side of Eq. (8) a term proportional to −κ log(P t /P 0 ), where κ measures the strength of the demand driven by fundamental considerations, and P 0 the true fair price (see also [29] , where this term was introduced). On short time scales, or if κ is sufficiently small, this term can be neglected and the analysis presented above should be valid. On long time scales, however, such that the random fluctuations become of the order of (say) 100 %, one should expect these mean reversion effects to become relevant. For a typical stock with a daily volatility of 3%, this corresponds to 1000 days, or four years. Such a time scale is precisely the typical reversion time scale discovered by de Bondt and Thaler in their paper on overreaction in stock markets [23] . Hence, in a world where absolute references are lacking, one expects that the short to medium time scale dynamics of markets will be dominated by the self-referential effects described in the present paper.
